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Abstract 
This paper offers a cautionary tale about the economic cost of European disintegration. Scotland 
provides an interesting twist on that story as somewhere that voted to remain part of the EU, but 
is now likely to be negatively affected, even though it is less directly exposed to EU trade than the 
UK. This occurs even if it were to achieve a softer Brexit with continued single market membership 
to which it aspires. The analysis includes potentially important lessons for the many nations and 
regions in which there exists pressures to move away from trade liberalisation and towards 
protectionism. 
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1. Introduction  
While the likely economic impact of leaving the EU on the economy currently dominates policy 
debate in the UK there is also considerable international interest. This applies even beyond the 
immediate speculation concerning the impact on ƚŚĞh< ?Ɛhtrading partners. There has been 
growing discontent with globalisation across many countries and there is a concern that other 
countries might leave the EU and indeed the initial focus was on the possibility of a Greek exit 
(Grexit). Furthermore, there are strong nationalist/ populist movements pressing for increased 
protectionism within the EU and beyond.1  
Most economists predict that leaving the EU will deliver a direct negative shock to trade, labour 
mobility and investment in the UK. There remains debate, however, over the scale of these effects 
and their subsequent impacts on economic activity. There is also a potentially offsetting benefit to 
the public finances through avoiding the net positive contribution that the UK presently makes to 
the EU budget. Dhingra et al. (2016a, 2016b, 2017a), Ebell and Warren (2016), HM Treasury 
(2016a, b), OECD (2016), Oxford Economics (2016) and PWC (2016) predict strongly negative 
economic effects from leaving the EU, whilst Capital Economics (2016) and Economists for Brexit 
(2016) give a more positive account.  
But any impacts of Brexit are accompanied by substantial uncertainty. Given that this is the first 
time a major economy has withdrawn from the EU, there is no direct prior information which can 
be used to measure impacts or guide attempts to mitigate any negative effects. Therefore, in order 
to aid our understanding of the nature and likely size of different impacts, an ex ante simulation 
                                                          
1 In the US the Trump administration decided not to join the Trans Pacific Partnership and wishes to renegotiate NAFTA. 
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model provides a valuable aid. However, such a model must be based on rigorous theoretical 
principles and, in this case, must be multi-sectoral, given that leaving the EU will impact 
differentially on UK industries, partly, but not wholly, reflecting their EU export and import 
dependency. 
Given the heterogeneity of UK, and indeed EU, regions, there is naturally considerable policy 
interest in the regional impacts of Brexit. There has been some discussion of the likelihood of 
effects varying across UK regions, which has been based essentially on spatial differences in EU 
trade patterns. However, this is an area that is, as yet, under-researched (Cicerone et al, 2017; 
Dhingra et al. 2017b; Los et al. 2017; Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute, 2016; 
Springford et al. 2016). In this paper we analyse the likely impact of leaving the EU on Scotland, a 
NUTS 1 region of the UK.2 The Scottish case is of particular interest for a number of reasons.  
First, as part of the UK, Scotland suffers, direct, indirect and induced impacts from leaving. Scotland 
is actually less directly exposed to EU trade than the rest-of-the UK (RUK), but since it is highly 
integrated with the RUK economy we expect strong indirect and induced geographic spillover 
effects. This implies that the impacts on both Scotland and RUK should be modelled 
simultaneously. Scotland is therefore illustrative of many EU regions in that the impact of a 
national shock from leaving will be transmitted partly through spillover effects from the other 
regions of the host nation. However, this is an aspect of Brexit that has yet to be explored. 
Second, Scotland is the region of the UK with the most extensive devolved fiscal, expenditure and 
legislative powers. In Scotland, many of the adaptive and mitigating policies that may be needed 
                                                          
2 Scotland makes up less than 10% of the UK economy on all conventional measures, except land area. 
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to accompany leaving the EU will have to be taken by the Scottish Parliament. The impact on the 
Scottish economy therefore needs to be separately modelled. 
Third, there is also a related political issue. Scotland voted by a majority of 62% to 38% for the UK 
to stay within the EU, with all 32 council areas backing Remain.3 The Scottish First Minister initially 
reacted to this with a call for a second Independence referendum for Scotland, a request that was 
denied by the UK Prime Minister. While the pressure for a further referendum is currently in 
abeyance, if leaving the EU imposes a continuing economic burden on the Scottish economy this 
could be the trigger for future political disruption.  
A final, pragmatic, reason for our focus on Scotland is the quality and availability of regional data; 
in particular, the existence of official input-output tables. Together with the UK data, this allows 
us to develop what is the first, as far as we are aware, full interregional CGE analysis of Brexit, 
albeit only for two regions, Scotland and RUK.4 
We obtain a number of interesting results. These include substantial negative effects on both 
ScotlaŶĚĂŶĚZh< ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌƌĞŐŝŽŶďĞŝŶŐŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐůŽǁĞƌ
exposure to EU trade. Of course, the scale of the effects varies with the precise nature of the post 
leave situation, with the WTO default  W  “ŶŽĚĞĂů ?Žƌ “ŚĂƌĚƌĞǆŝƚ ?- position creating the greatest 
negative effects. We also confirm that there are strong spillovers to Scotland from the RUK: an 
explicitly interregional analysis proves essential if the significant biases that would result from a 
 “ƐƚĂŶĚĂůŽŶĞ ? ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞnt of the impact of Brexit on the Scottish economy are to be avoided. 
                                                          
3 The results are reported by the BBC: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-36599102. This reflects a 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ŶŽƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐĂŐĞ ?ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůŵĂŬĞƵƉ ?>ĂŶŐĞůůĂĂŶĚDĂŶŶŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
4 Dhingra et al. (2017b) derive results for all NUTS2 regions of the UK, but they do so by distributing national industry results to 
ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚŽƐĞƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ?ƐĞĐƚŽƌĂůĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐŚĂƌĞƐ ? 
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Furthermore, while these adverse impacts are mitigated by the reduction in the net fiscal 
contribution to the EU, they are not, even on the most optimistic estimates, nearly sufficient to 
offset them. In fact, the fiscal position after leaving the EU is always worse than before because of 
the lost taxing revenue flowing from reduced economic activity. Nor do our results represent a 
worst case scenario: if dynamic effects link productivity to the degree of openness or inward 
investment the scale of the contraction would be exacerbated, as it would be if the pressures for 
international migration created by Brexit are reflected in actual population movements. Our 
results also shed doubt on the populist notion that it would be in our interest to erect import 
barriers in retaliation for any EU-imposed barriers to our exports: this would actually add to the 
economic bad news. 
Overall, we believe that our analysis offers a cautionary tale about the economic cost of European 
disintegration. Scotland provides an interesting twist on that story as it is negatively affected, even 
though it is less directly exposed to EU trade than the UK. This occurs even if it were to achieve a 
softer Brexit with continued single market membership to which it aspires. The analysis includes 
potentially important lessons for the nations and regions in which there exists pressures to move 
away from trade liberalisation and towards protectionism. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the key channels through 
which leaving the EU may have an impact on the Scottish economy. Section 3 provides a short 
outline of the modelling framework. Section 4 sets out a range of scenarios that could hold in a 
post-Brexit world, whilst Section 5 presents the key results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Assessing the long-term impact of Brexit on the Scottish economy 
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Theory suggests that, in general, a retreat from trade liberalisation will have negative effects (e.g. 
Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Baldwin and Venables, 1995). However, in the case of Brexit net fiscal 
savings associated with leaving the EU provide a possible countervailing influence. To resolve the 
uncertainty about the direction and scale of the various channels through which alternative forms 
of Brexit could impact the economy, it is necessary to use models of the UK economy.5 
In part because of their multi-sectoral structure, which can accommodate the differential impacts 
of trade barriers across industries, CGE models have been very widely applied to explore trade 
issues; although the focus has usually been on the consequences of stimulating, rather than 
reversing, trade liberalisation (e.g. Baldwin and Venables, 1995). PwC (2016) and Dhingra et al. 
(2016a, 2017a) provide the first CGE analyses of the impact of Brexit on the UK economy. PwC 
(2016) uses a flexible, full-employment model that estimates fairly modest GDP effects. Similarly, 
Dhingra et al. (2016a, 2017a) employ a flexible model of world trade, which is medium-term in 
orientation given the absence of any treatment of physical capital, and again finds comparatively 
modest Brexit impacts. We discuss the reasons why our results are different in Section 5. 
As we have already noted, in order to identify the regional impacts of leaving the EU we have to 
deal with likely spatial spillovers. So the direct impacts on Scotland of lower integration with the 
EU are likely to be compounded by additional indirect and induced effects coming through the 
impact of Brexit on the RUK economy, given the importance of the RUK market for Scottish 
exports. Accordingly, it is essential to adopt an explicitly interregional analysis that can capture 
such spillovers.  
                                                          
5 In fact, as we discuss in Section 4, there are further ambiguities surrounding the system-wide output effects of barriers to 
imports from the EU. The balance of countervailing effects can only be determined by empirical modelling. 
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To assess the likely long-run implications of leaving, a helpful start is to look at the degree of trade 
integration between Scotland and the EU. Table 1 shows the value of Scottish exports to the EU 
for aggregate Services and Manufacturing, with the figures for the largest sectors within these 
categories separately identified. 6  
 
Table 1: Scottish EU Exports by Industry Sector, 2014 
 
Value, £ M 
Share of EU exports in total 
international exports 
Total EU Exports 11,560 43% 
Manufacturing 6,695 47% 
Food & Drink 1,775 37% 
Coke, refined petroleum and chemical products 1,775 83% 
Machinery and Equipment NEC 650 37% 
Rubber & Plastic Products 575 71% 
Computer, electronic and optical products 555 50% 
Services 3,885 40% 
Wholesale & Retail 1,095 61% 
Professional Services 760 32% 
Administrative and Support Services 380 30% 
Transportation and Storage 355 63% 
Other 980 57% 
Source: Export Statistics Scotland (2016)7 
                                                          
6 EU export data contained here http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/Exports/ESSPublication/ESSAddTables  
7 There remain ongoing questions around the quality and completeness of export data for Scotland. We would expect a 
ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌĂůƌĞŐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh<ƚŽƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŚĂǀĞƌĂƚŚĞƌůĞƐƐƚƌĂĚĞǁŝƚŚZh< ?ĂŶĚƌĂƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞǁŝƚŚZKt ?ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ “ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ƌĞŐŝŽŶŽf 
the UK. In fact, the reverse is true; Scotland has significantly greater trade links with RUK and greater links with ROW than we 
would have expected. See Lecca et al (2015) for discussion. However, the Scottish Export Statistics remain the best source for 
information on Scottish exports. The need for greater coverage of Scottish trade should be an urgent priority for both the Scottish 
and UK Governments. FAI is currently involved in an Economic Statistics Centre of Excellence project on improving regional trade 
data. 
9 
 
 
This information identifies those sectors that are most directly exposed to any change in the 
trading relationship with the EU. Many of the sectors with the largest EU exports are in 
manufacturing  W including Food & Drink  W but Scotland also has high levels of EU exports in 
services, particularly those tied to professions, such as legal services, R&D activities, education, IT 
and finance.  
Many of these sectors are likely to be potential recipients of some special treatment at UK or 
Scottish levels. However, the particular concerns of individual industries will vary and will depend 
on more than simply the ƐŝǌĞŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?ƐĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞƚŽhƚƌĂĚĞ ?DĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐŽĨ
the sector will be important, including the sensitivity of the sector to adjustments to 
competitiveness that arise through endogenous changes in the real exchange rate and wage rate. 
Examining statistics such as those given in Table 1 is a useful exercise but is only a starting point. 
What is also needed is an assessment of how wider economic transmission mechanisms will feed 
through to the Scottish economy. Here a multi-regional CGE analysis is required to determine both 
the direction and scale of the impacts on both Scotland and RUK.8 However, a full interregional 
model for the UK is precluded by data availability. Our two-region CGE model of Scotland and rUK, 
allows us to undertake the first UK interregional CGE analysis of Brexit.  
Finally, it is important to note that this modelling exercise takes other policies as given.9 It is likely 
that policy will respond in the aftermath of leaving the EU. For example, the UK Government 
                                                          
8 Dhingra et al. (2017b), do provide estimates of impacts on NUTS 2 UK regions, but these are obtained by regionalising the UK 
results from their world trade model simulations (Dhingra et al.,2016a,2017b). These are unable to capture interregional 
interactions and spillovers. 
9 For example, we assume that both regional fiscal deficits are maintained at their initial levels. 
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immediately relaxed its targets for reducing the fiscal deficit and has asserted that advantageous 
new trade deals with third countries will be possible post-Brexit. Further, it may be that R&D and 
other regional competitiveness policies might be pursued.10 However, we do not consider the 
effect of such policy initiatives. Our aim is simply to isolate the system-wide impact of leaving the 
EU.  
 
3. Model description 
In order to capture spillover effects between Scotland and the rest of the UK and to minimise 
aggregation biases, we adopt a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of the UK economy, 
AMOSRUK. It is effectively a multi-sectoral, multi-regional variant of the disaggregated Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman model (1991, chapter 6), which incorporates imperfect competition in the 
regional labour market.  
The model includes two endogenous regions  W Scotland and RUK  W and two exogenous regions  W 
the rest of the EU (REU) and the rest of the world (ROW) and it is parameterised on an interregional 
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Scotland and RUK for 2010.11 There are three transactor groups 
in each region  W households, firms and government  W and eighteen productive sectors.12  
Firms and trade 
                                                          
10 However, the literature on liberalisation would suggest that an adverse effect on R&D from trade reductions. 
11 The SAM is produced by the Fraser of Allander Institute and can be downloaded from 
http://www.strath.ac.uk/business/economics/fraserofallanderinstitute/research/economicmodelling/ 
12 The complete model listing is given in Appendix A. 
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In each sector, local intermediate inputs are combined with imports from the other region and the 
rest of the world (EU and non-EU) via an Armington link (Armington, 1969); value added is 
produced by combination of capital and labour. Intermediate input is then combined with value 
added to determine the ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƐŐƌŽƐƐŽƵƚƉƵƚ ?This is done using a nested CES production function 
with an elasticity of substitution of 0.3 (Harris, 1989).  
The price of imports and the interest rate are both set exogenously in perfectly integrated 
national/international markets. Regional exports are determined through conventional 
(Armington) trade function. Non-price determinants of export demand from the rest of the world 
are taken to be exogenous. Export demand of the other UK region is fully endogenous, depending 
not only on relative prices, but also on all elements of intermediate and final demand in the other 
region. 
Imports from ROW are disaggregated between imports from non-EU and from EU countries (see 
Figure 1). This structure is adopted for import of intermediate input as well as for household and 
investment demand.  
Figure 1. Schematic of the nested Armington system  
 
Import channel
UK
Scotland RUK
ROW
REU Non-EU
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The Armington equation at each level and for each component of demand takes the following 
standard form: 
ܦ ?௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ܦ ?௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ቈቆߜ௥ǡ௜ଵߜ௥ǡ௜ଶ ቇ  ?ቆ ܲ ?௥ǡ௜ǡܲ ?௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ቇ቉ ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ (1) 
where D1 and D2 stand for demand for goods and services from two different origins; P1 and P2 
stand for respective prices; ߩ஺ is the import elasticity of substitution between output from origins 
1 and 2 and is set to 2 (Gibson, 1990); ߜଵ and ߜଶ are the shares in the Armington function. 
Exports to every destination depend on relative prices and an elasticity of substitution between 
outputs from different origins. Export equations take the following form: 
ܧ ?௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܧ ?തതതത௜  ? ቆܲܧ ?௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ܴܲ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ቇఙ೔ೣ  (2) 
where E1 is the volume of exports to destination 1, ܧ ?തതതത is the baseline level of exports to destination 
1, PE1 is an exogenous price at destination 1, PR is domestic price and ߪ௫  is export elasticity of 
substitution between outputs from different origins.  
Trade from/to the rest of the world is separated into EU and non-EU regions using the data on 
export and import patterns from the Trade in Value Added (TiVA) data for the UK and Scottish 
Export Statistics. Since detailed data on trade partners for imports to Scotland are unavailable we 
use the UK sectoral proportions to distribute total imports.  
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Investment  
Investment demand from each sector is a proportion of the difference between actual and desired 
capital stock (Eq. A.58), where desired capital stock is ĚĞƌŝǀĞĚ ďǇ Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ ĐŽƐƚ ŵŝŶŝŵŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ  ?Ƌ ?
A.59). In the long-run equilibrium actual and desired capital stocks are equal. 
Labour market 
Wages are determined within each region using a regional wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1994) based on the econometrically-parameterised relationship in Layard et al (1991). The 
effective population constraint applies at the regional level, with regional real wages reflecting the 
tightness of the regional labour market, measured as inversely related to the regional 
unemployment rate. In our default simulation it is assumed that there is no international or 
interregional migration.13 Therefore population and potential labour supply in each region remains 
unchanged during the simulation period.  
Government 
We assume that Scotland and RUK maintain a fixed fiscal deficit in the face of the Brexit shocks. 
Any variation in tax revenues are absorbed by changes in both GovernmentƐ ?ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? 14 
                                                          
13 However, we do briefly discuss the importance of migration in Section 4, and report some simulation results allowing for 
migration in Section 5. For interregional migration we employ the estimated net migration function reported in Layard et al 
(1991), which relates net migration to real wage and unemployment rate differentials. We also note the limiting case of 
international migration in the absence of barriers to such movements, which implies fixed real wage rates in both regions. 
14 Of course, this implies that government spending falls in response to a Brexit-induced decline in activity and in tax revenues, 
ĞǆĂĐĞƌďĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?hŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŶĞǁ&ŝƐĐĂů&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŝƐŶŽǁĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽŶŝƚƐŝŶĐŽŵĞƚĂǆ
revenues. The UK could alternatively borrow more, but the ultimate direction of effects would be the same. 
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Appendix A contains a complete model listing. 
4. Scenarios 
We first consider alternative variants of Brexit, and then discuss how these are reflected in our 
simulations. 
4.1 Alternative variants of Brexit 
Given the uncertainties surrounding leaving the EU, we need to consider alternative futures, 
reflecting a range of different possible trading relationships. We explicitly model two main effects. 
These are: the imposition of additional constraints to UK trade with the EU; and the repatriation 
of fiscal contributions that the UK currently makes to the EU budget. We do not explicitly model 
the potential migration, FDI and productivity effects identified in the literature because their scale 
is so uncertain.15,16  
We model two illustrative leave scenarios for the UK-EU interactions, namely a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with the EU and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) scenarios. Both of the 
options involve: 
x Stopping or reducing financial contributions to the EU;  
x Ending the free movement of people; 
x retaining all trade deals between the EU and third countries. 
The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU assumes that: 
                                                          
15 We do briefly consider these effects in Figus et al (2017). 
16 For the discussion of the effects of reducing migration to the UK after Brexit see Lisenkova K, Sanchez-Martinez M (2016) 
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x leaving the Single Market and customs union and therefore being subject to an  ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ďŽƌĚĞƌ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ‘ƌƵůĞƐŽĨŽƌŝŐŝŶ ?; 
x negotiating a free trade agreement with the EU, which will be less comprehensive than 
membership of the Single Market;  
x reduced or no fiscal contributions to the EU. 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) scenario is the default, which would apply if a better deal 
cannot be secured. dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞ “ŶŽĚĞĂů ?Žƌ “ŚĂƌĚƌĞǆŝƚ ?ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ ?ǁŚŝĐŚinvolves: 
x falling back to the WTO rules for trade with the EU; 
x tariffs on trade with the EU; 
x no financial contributions to the EU. 
The aim of these scenarios is to provide an illustration of the direction and scale of possible 
impacts. Each scenario implies a different degree of integration with the EU. All scenarios assume 
an unchanged policy stance, so that both regions maintain their initial fiscal deficits. Given that 
public sector revenues typically fall in response to an adverse economic shock, such as that 
embodied in Brexit, this requires corresponding reductions in government expenditures, which 
exacerbate the contractionary impact (at least in the absence of the reduction in the net fiscal 
contribution after leaving the EU).  
All simulations presented here are timed from the moment when the agreement on Brexit is 
implemented; that is from the end of any transitionary adjustment period that may be agreed. We 
gradually introduce shocks over the first ten periods of the simulations. 
Trade shocks 
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We use estimates of the impact on UK trade under these two stylised scenarios reported in Ebell 
(2016). She uses an empirical gravity model and the most recent available data for 42 countries to 
estimate the effect of membership of the European Economic Area (EEA)17 and other, looser, FTAs 
on trade in goods and services. This methodology is similar to that used by other contributions in 
the literature and arrives at effects of comparable size (Baier et al, 2008; Ceglowski, 2006; Egger 
et al, 2011). However, Ebell (2016) uses the most recent data, differentiates trade in goods and 
services, and explicitly models the effects of EEA membership and other FTAs.  
Table 2 provides estimates of the reduction in trade with the EU for goods and services under each 
scenario. These are substantial18. Due to the way the model was specified in Ebell (2016) with one 
dummy variable representing the overall effect on bilateral trade, this dummy captures three 
groups of effects: 1) tariff barriers; 2) non-tariff barriers; and 3) border effects. The first component 
is often discussed and is easy to describe and understand. In simple terms, after leaving the Single 
Market the UK might be subject to tariffs. In the WTO case they will be the most favoured nation 
(MFN) tariffs. They constitute a smaller part of the trade restrictions. In 2014 the trade weighted 
average tariff applied by the EU was 2.7% (WTO, 2016) 
 
Table 2: Impact of various post-Brexit scenarios on ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐĞxports 
 
Estimated reduction in EU trade 
 
Goods Services 
FTA Scenario -40%19 -63% 
                                                          
17 28 countries of the EU plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein 
18 The quantitative impact we derive ultimately depends upon the scale and composition of the initial shock. Different studies use 
different estimates of the possible effect of Brexit on trade. We have tested for a wide range of scenarios and whilst the 
quantitative impacts change, the qualitative impacts and relative scale of the effects between regions, sectors and transmission 
channels found here still hold. 
19 We use arithmetic averages of the rage of estimated effects (using different model specifications) from Ebell (2016). 
17 
 
WTO Scenario -61% -63% 
Source: Ebell (2016) 
 
Non-tariff barriers represent infrastructure (customs queue and checks), bureaucratic (rules of 
origin) and regulatory (product standards) restrictions. Non-tariff barriers are usually estimated to 
be more important than tariff barriers in restricting trade. Non-tariff barriers include the customs 
controls for goods being exported to the EU20 ?  ‘ZƵůĞƐ ŽĨ KƌŝŐŝŶ ? ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ĞǆƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ƚŽ ŽďƚĂŝŶ
certificates to demonstrate the domestic content of their exports. The cost of these restrictions 
can be significant, particularly for smaller firms and businesses that rely on complex cross-border 
supply chains. Firms trading with the EU have to submit customs declarations and there can be 
complications with VAT arrangements when products cross borders. This may have implications 
for costs, efficiency and time competitiveness21. 
The third component  W border effects  W is much less well understood. It reflects the observation 
that regions within a country trade with each other much more that similar regions across 
countries (e.g. McCallum, 1995; Evans, 2001). These unexplained border effects are usually very 
large, attributable to unobservable, perhaps psychological, effects and can be extremely difficult 
to change. 
                                                          
20The relevant form has more than 50 boxes requesting information, and the guidance is 78 pages long. It typically requires 
evidence proving products are either made inside the EEA, or comply with a number of product specific rules. For information see 
- http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-ontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2005:321:FULL&from=en 
21 HM Treasure estimate that over half of UK goods exports to the EU would need to be certified as complying with rules of origin 
requirements in order to continue to receive tariff-free access into the Single Market. 
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We interpret the reduction in trade associated with looser integration with the EU as a change in 
explicit (tariffs) and implicit (non-tariff barriers and border effects) prices. All three groups of 
factors will make it costlier for the UK to trade with the EU (and vice-versa). To introduce these 
changes into the model we increase the EU import price in the import equation (1), and reduce 
the EU price in the export equation (2). This implies that imports from the EU are now more 
expensive in the UK, and UK exports to the EU are less competitive. We calibrate the price shocks 
to achieve the overall long-run reductions in EU export and import quantities reported in Table 2. 
To account for delays in responses to changes in tariff and non-tariff barriers we introduce the 
shocks gradually over ten years.  
We apply universal price shocks across all sectors. However, the resulting trade impacts vary across 
sectors, depending on each ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?Ɛ exposure to EU trade through both exports and imports. 
Overall RUK is more directly exposed to EU trade through both import and export channels. Total 
EU imports constitute 7% of total output in Scotland and 9% in RUK, whilst EU exports make up 4% 
of total output in Scotland and 7% in RUK. Also RUK is a much larger trading partner for Scotland. 
Both RUK imports and exports comprise 15% of total Scottish output but Scottish trade makes up 
only 1% of RUK output. Not surprisingly, these differences have a significant impact on our 
simulation results.  
Fiscal contributions 
In the Brexit referendum a key element of the debate was the return to the UK of the net fiscal 
contribution made to the EU, which stood at £8.6bn in 2014. This takes account of the UK rebate 
and other receipts, such as those distributed through the CAP and EU structural funds, and 
assumes that the UK Government replaces all EU expenditures made in the UK. 
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We model the positive effects resulting from the reduced EU contribution as higher UK public 
expenditure (even after maintaining existing EU spending in both Scotland and RUK). The extent 
of the positive fiscal effects depends upon the negotiated settlement. Both Norway (a member of 
EEA) and Switzerland (a member of EFTA) make contributions to the EU budget despite not being 
members of the EU. We consider the UK benefits from the full saving of current net EU 
contributions. Of course, any realistic settlement under the FTA scenario is likely to be less 
favourable, but it provides us with an estimate of the maximum fiscal benefits that would be 
associated with a WTO outcome. Assuming that the fiscal stimulus is allocated to UK regions on a 
population share basis implies that ƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞs by £690m (8% of 
the total UK contribution) and the RUK budget increases by £7.91bn.22,23 Throughout we assume 
that both the UK and Scottish Governments spend the additional resource.24  
4.2 Simulation set-up 
As discussed above, the export and import price shocks that we simulate in AMOSRUK are 
calibrated to generate, as closely as possible, the trade reductions reported in Table 2 for the FTA 
and WTO scenarios. A perfect match is difficult to achieve since both import and export volumes 
are endogenous and influence one another. Also, as we have seen, the two regions have different 
exposures to trade with the EU and thus react to the same price shock differently. All types of 
                                                          
22 EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƐŚĂƌŝŶŐŽŶůǇĂƉƉůŝĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŶĞƚĨŝƐĐĂůƐĂǀŝŶŐ ?Đ^ŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐŚŝŐŚĞƌƐŚĂƌĞŽĨĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƐƵďƐŝĚŝĞƐ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂmple, is 
ƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚhƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞh< ? 
23 ScotůĂŶĚ ?Ɛshare of UK public expenditure in 2015/16 was 9% (GERS) whilst ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ (2014) and GDP (2015) share 
was 8%.  
24 We do not explore variations on the fiscal settlement under FTA in detail, since our results prove to be insensitive to such 
variations.  
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trade restrictions (tariff and non-tariff barriers and border effects) are expressed in the form of 
 “ĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚ ?ƚĂƌŝĨĨƐ ? 
The exogenous price changes that we simulate are reported in Table 3. The size of the shocks vary 
between exports and imports and between goods and services (and recall that services usually are 
not included in FTAs), but apply shocks of the same size to Scotland and RUK in each category. The 
permanent price shocks are introduced gradually over a ten-year period.  
 
Table 3. The permanent import and export price shocks attributable to Brexit under the WTO 
(FTA) scenarios (% changes) 
 Period 1 Period 5 Period 10 
Export price of goods -3.5 (-2.2) -17.5 (-11.0) -35.0 (-22.0) 
Export price of services -4.0 (-4.0) -20.0 (-20.0) -40.0 (-40.0) 
Import price of goods 7.0 (3.0) 35.0 (15.0) 70.0 (30.0) 
Import price of services 5.5 (5.5) 27.5 (27.5) 55.0 (55.0) 
 
Import price shocks are equivalent to the import tariffs (without the revenues).25 Interpreting the 
export price shocks is less straightforward. They show loss of competitiveness of domestic goods 
relative to other exports to the EU. If the EU export market price is lower UK goods become less 
competitive. The 22%-40% of export price shocks in the FTA scenario are equivalent to a 28%-
                                                          
25 As was mentioned before non-tariff barriers constitute a larger part of trade restrictions and affect the real costs of trade. 
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67%26 UK export tariff (or EU import tariff). The 35%-40% of export price shocks in the WTO 
scenario are equivalent to a 54%-67% UK export tariff (or EU import tariff). Thus, tariff equivalent 
shocks are similar in magnitude to achieve comparable reductions in export and imports.  
Throughout we assume zero net interregional and international migration.27 
 
5. Results 
We first report the results of the export and import price shocks reflecting the combined effects 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers created by Brexit. We then consider the likely impact of the net 
fiscal saving. The possible impacts of Brexit on migration flows are then discussed. Throughout we 
report real consumption and real government expenditure per capita as indicators of welfare. 
The trade shocks 
It is clear from Table 3 that FTA and WTO scenarios are qualitatively very similar; only the size of 
the price shocks differs. Not surprisingly, therefore, the results are qualitatively similar, differing 
only in terms of the scale of impacts. Here we concentrate primarily on the case of a hard Brexit 
(WTO), but note the impact ŽĨƚŚĞ “ƐŽĨƚĞƌ ?exit (FTA) would be on key results.28 
Leaving the EU triggers a combination of price changes that generate a range of complex 
responses, some of which are conflicting. It is easiest to understand its overall impact by first 
                                                          
26 To calculate equivalent export tariff we divide domestic price in the base year (normalised to 1) by the resultant EU export 
price. For example, 1/(1-0.22)=1.28.  
27 Figus et al (2017) consider possible migration responses. 
28 We report the full FTA results in Appendix A to Figus et al (2017). 
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examining the impacts of export and import price changes separately. Table 4 summarises the 
results of applying only the export price shocks for the WTO scenario. All figures are expressed as 
percentage changes relative to the baseline and are reported for the short run, where capital 
stocks are fixed, five and ten years after the introduction of the shock, and for the long run, where 
capital stocks are fully adjusted and the economy has returned to a steady state equilibrium.  
 
Table 4. WTO scenario applied only to export prices (% changes relative to baseline) 
Periods Sort Run 5 years 10 years Long Run 
GDP -0.0 -0.5 -1.6 -3.0 
Total Exports -0.6 -3.2 -6.7 -8.3 
Exports of goods to the EU -5.1 -25.7 -50.5 -51.8 
Exports of services to the EU -6.1 -29.8 -57.2 -57.5 
Exports to non-EU 1.8 9.0 17.5 16.1 
Exports to RUK  0.0 -0.3 -1.4 -3.2 
Total imports -0.6 -3.4 -6.8 -8.0 
Imports of goods from the EU -1.5 -7.3 -13.8 -14.3 
Imports of services from the EU -1.6 -8.3 -15.6 -16.4 
Imports from non-EU -1.7 -7.9 -14.6 -14.9 
Imports from RUK 0.4 1.2 1.5 -0.3 
CPI -0.8 -3.9 -7.3 -6.9 
Employment -0.0 -0.4 -1.2 -2.3 
Real wage -0.0 -0.7 -1.8 -3.1 
Consumption  -0.2 -1.4 -3.3 -4.6 
Government expenditure 0.4 1.5 2.0 -0.3 
Source: simulation results 
 
The imposition of the tariff (and tariff-equivalent-non-tariff barriers) on our exports to the EU 
reduces the competitiveness of UK goods within the EU and leads to a reduction in the price 
received by exporters and in the demand for those exports. The contraction in demand for UK 
produced goods leads to a reduction in economic activity and domestic prices and wages, with the 
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latter pressures mitigating the contraction to a degree through improving competitiveness relative 
to ROW (Table 4). Initially this reflects excess capacity and falling rental rates, especially in export 
sectors, but the fall in demand for goods and services has a negative impact on the labour market. 
Employment falls, the unemployment rate rises, and real wages are pushed down, depressing 
consumption. CPI falls continuously and is 7.3% below the base value by period 10. Improvement 
in competitiveness vis-a-vis ROW arising from the fall in prices leads to increases in exports to non-
EU countries, which mitigates some of the negative effects. Capital stocks gradually contract until 
capacity is ultimately at its desired level, in each sector, in long-run equilibrium. 
The introduction of tariff (and tariff-equivalent non-tariff barriers) on imports increases the 
domestic prices of imports and reduces the demand for them (Table 5). The import price shock 
ŝŶĚƵĐĞƐĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĂůůǇĐŽƵŶƚĞƌǀĂŝůŝŶŐĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐŝŵƉŽƌƚƐ ?three uses as intermediate 
inputs, household consumption and investment goods. Consumption, investment and domestic 
prices all rise due to increased import prices. Intermediates exert the strongest impact because 
this adversely affects competitiveness and domestic (e.g., household consumption) as well as 
export demand, so economic activity declines. Table 5 shows that in this simulation under the WTO 
scenario domestic prices rise by 9.5% by year 10 and GDP and employment decline by 4.4% and 
5.0% respectively over the same time period. This compares to the 1.6% and 1.2% falls in the same 
variable with the export price shock reported in Table 4. 
It might seem counterintuitive that import restrictions would have a stronger negative impact on 
the economy. The populist view of protectionism is that it is likely to have significant benefits for 
the home economy. However, Caplan (2007) argues that this is an example of voter irrationality 
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and an emotional, zero-sum attitude to trade and interaction in general with outsiders 
(foreigners). The results in Table 6 suggest that this view might have some traction. 
 
Table 5. WTO scenario applied only to import prices (% changes relative to baseline) 
Periods 
Sort 
Run 
5 years 10 years Long Run 
GDP -0.3 -2.0 -4.4 -6.2 
Total Exports -0.4 -2.0 -4.3 -6.4 
Exports of goods to the EU -2.1 -8.4 -14.1 -15.5 
Exports of services to the EU -0.9 -5.1 -10.2 -12.2 
Exports to non-EU -1.7 -7.6 -13.3 -14.8 
Exports to RUK  0.4 1.0 0.6 -1.7 
Total imports -1.9 -7.3 -12.0 -13.2 
Imports of goods from the EU -7.7 -30.1 -47.1 -47.9 
Imports of services from the EU -9.4 -35.3 -54.2 -54.2 
Imports from non-EU 2.2 10.9 19.8 19.3 
Imports from RUK 0.2 0.5 0.0 -2.0 
CPI 1.0 5.1 9.5 10.4 
Employment -0.5 -2.5 -5.0 -6.4 
Real wage -0.9 -3.8 -6.9 -8.3 
Consumption  -0.8 -3.3 -5.9 -7.2 
Government expenditure -1.9 -8.7 -15.6 -18.3 
Source: simulation results 
 
Table 6: WTO scenario, applied only to imports for household consumption, with a fixed nominal 
wage (% changes relative to baseline) 
Periods Sort Run 5 years 10 years Long Run 
GDP -0.1 -0.0 0.6 2.2 
Total Exports -0.0 0.2 0.8 2.2 
Exports of goods to the EU -0.3 -1.0 -1.2 0.0 
Exports of services to the EU -0.2 -0.9 -1.2 -0.0 
Exports to non-EU -0.3 -0.9 -1.2 0.0 
Exports to RUK  0.1 0.8 1.9 3.4 
Total imports -0.6 -1.7 -2.3 -1.5 
Imports of goods from the EU -1.2 -4.1 -5.9 -5.8 
Imports of services from the EU -3.6 -13.1 -19.6 -19.1 
imports from RUK 0.2 1.0 2.2 3.3 
Imports from non-EU 0.2 1.3 2.4 2.8 
CPI 0.4 1.8 2.9 2.3 
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Employment -0.1 -0.0 0.6 2.1 
Real wage -0.4 -1.8 -2.9 -2.3 
Consumption  -0.3 -0.9 -0.9 0.3 
Government expenditure -0.8 -2.8 -3.7 -1.5 
Source: simulation results 
The simulation results reported in Table 6 provide a decomposition of the import price effect, to 
focus on the transmission mechanism through consumption. First, import prices are only increased 
for consumption goods and services. The prices of imported intermediates and investment goods 
are unaffected. Second, the nominal wage is held constant. Although we initially observe very 
small negative GDP and employment effects, by year 10 there is a 0.6% increase in GDP and 
employment. In this case there is no direct feed through from import restrictions to domestic 
product prices. Substitution by consumers away from imports (and international trade) to 
domestic goods and services (and interregional trade) stimulates domestic output. However, this 
positive effect comes at the cost of falling real wages, which decline by 2.9% by year 10. Under the 
bargained real wage closure, the impact again becomes negative: even without the impact on 
intermediates, the adverse supply effect of the import price rise dominates the beneficial 
consumption effect on economic activity.  
However, in fact, imports include intermediates and the import price rise imparts an adverse 
supply shock to the Scottish economy, reinforced where wages are determined in real terms so 
that, overall, increasing barriers to imports from the EU exacerbates the contraction in both 
regions. 
These findings have interesting, and perhaps surprising policy implications. Outside of negotiations 
the UK has no influence over the export restrictions it will face after leaving the EU. However, 
import restrictions are, to some extent, under the control of the UK government. Even if WTO rules 
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govern the level of tariffs imposed on imports of goods and services from the EU after Brexit, the 
UK can choose what type of controls to impose at the border. It can be argued that, if it so chooses, 
the UK government could allow continued open access for the EU imports in the UK market. In 
public debate protectionist measures are often thought to benefit the home (tariff-imposing) 
country. Our results suggest that this is not the case for the UK, at least as far as trade with the EU 
is concerned. Even if the EU does not grant the UK a preferential trade deal, adoption by the UK of 
a more lenient attitude towards EU imports would be in its own interests P “ƌĞƚĂůŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚĞƌĞǁŽƵůĚ
be self-defeating, and exacerbate the scale of the contractions.  
Of course, Brexit in fact involves the simultaneous implementation of both export and import price 
shocks, with the latter applying to all imports. Table 7 reports the overall Brexit results for the WTO 
scenario under our default model assumptions of a bargained real wage and no migration.  
 
Table 7. WTO scenario, all price shocks applied (% changes relative to baseline) 
Periods Sort Run 5 years 10 years Long Run 
RUK Long 
Run  
GDP -0.3 -2.4 -5.8 -9.7 -13.0 
Total Exports -0.9 -5.0 -10.2 -14.5 -24.4 
Exports of goods to the EU -7.0 -32.0 -57.6 -59.7 -60.6 
Exports of services to the EU -6.9 -33.4 -61.7 -63.2 -60.5 
Exports to non-EU 0.0 0.7 1.7 -2.3 1.8 
Exports to RUK  0.4 0.9 -0.4 -5.6 -3.3 
Total imports -2.5 -9.9 -16.5 -19.5 -35.6 
Imports of goods from the EU -9.1 -34.9 -53.9 -55.1 -59.6 
Imports of services from the EU -10.9 -40.4 -60.9 -61.3 -65.2 
Imports from non-EU 0.5 2.4 3.1 1.9 -62.4 
Imports from RUK 0.6 1.9 1.9 -3.3 -5.6 
CPI 0.2 0.9 1.4 3.2 -0.3 
Employment -0.5 -2.8 -5.9 -9.2 -12.5 
Real wage -0.9 -4.0 -7.2 -9.9 -11.5 
Consumption  -0.9 -4.4 -8.2 -11.1 -14.6 
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Government expenditure -1.5 -6.9 -12.7 -18.6 -26.6 
Source: simulation results 
 
The two types of trade shocks have countervailing effects on prices; here the upward pressure on 
prices from imports predominates. Combining the two shocks reinforces the negative effects of 
each on exports, GDP and employment, given the nature and scale of imports from the EU. 
Scotland does not now obtain the full benefit from the improvement in competitiveness vis-a-vis 
non-EU countries that it would enjoy if only export prices are affected.  
As expected there are substantial contractions in real consumption and real wages, with rises in 
the CPI reflecting the net effect of increases in import prices and falls in export competitiveness in 
REU markets.29 After 10 years GDP is down nearly 6% in Scotland (and 7.4% in RUK). While the 
WTO results reported ŚĞƌĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚĂǁŽƌƐƚĐĂƐĞ “ŶŽĚĞĂů ?ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ ? the FTA simulation does suggest 
that although a softer Brexit would be associated with smaller impacts, these are still very 
substantial, with reductions in GDP of 4% in Scotland and 5% in RUK (by year 10).30  
The benefits of using a multi-regional model can be seen by comparing the results presented above 
with a simulation which only applies shocks to Scotland. Between 17% and 18% of the long-run 
effect on GDP and employment is due to the spillovers from the RUK. Ignoring them by using a 
single-region model for simulations would significantly underestimate the negative effect of Brexit 
on Scotland.  
                                                          
29 Recall that our default assumption is zero net migration, so that e.g. percentage changes in real consumption also indicate 
percentage changes in real consumption per capita; welfare declines in both Scotland and RUK (here and across all the trade 
simulations). 
30 For full FTA results see Appendix A to Figus et al (2017). 
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Overall, we estimate the impacts of Brexit through trade to be rather more severe than the CGE 
analyses of PwC (2016) and Dhingra et al. (2017a). The first  W and major - part of the explanation 
is simply the scale of the shock to trade flows following Brexit. We base this on Ebell (2016) because 
these are the best estimates of their kind, focussed explicitly on Brexit. Second, we have a model 
that allows adjustment to a long-run equilibrium in which all capital stocks are ultimately at their 
desired levels; it is clear from our simulations that the impact of Brexit typically increases with the 
time interval considered. Third our model has some features that are closer to conventional 
macro-economic models in capturing aspects of imperfect competition in the labour market, and 
in having investment independent of savings and driven by profitability.  Estimates of Brexit 
impacts from conventional macroeconomic models tend to be greater than those from other CGE 
models. (HM Treasury, 2016). Fourth, we consider import as well as export price effects, whereas 
others have tended to focus only on exports (e.g. Ebell and Warren, 2016), perhaps on the basis 
that these are (at least to a much greater extent) under the influence of the UK Government. As 
ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ƐĞĞŶ ? ĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇ ƚŽ ƉŽƉƵůŝƐƚ ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƐ ? ǁĞ ĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚ  “ƌĞƚĂůŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ƚŽ ŽƵƌ
imports from the EU significantly reduces economic activity and welfare: indeed we find this to be 
even more important in governing the overall impact of Brexit than the impact on our exports to 
the EU. 
Fiscal effects 
Table 8 illustrates the effect of the fiscal stimulus that results from discontinuing the entire EU net 
fiscal contribution, and distributing the saving between Scotland and RUK on the basis of 
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population shares.31 Of course, currently both the total net fiscal saving, and its distribution across 
regions are unknown.  
 
Table 8: Fiscal effects: long-term (% changes relative to baseline) 
Periods Sort Run 5 years 10 years Long Run 
GDP 0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  
Total Exports -0.7  -0.8  -0.9  -0.9  
Exports of goods to the EU -0.8  -1.2  -1.3  -1.3  
Exports of services to the EU -2.2  -1.8  -1.7  -1.7  
Exports to RUK  -0.4  -0.5  -0.5  -0.6  
Total imports 1.1  0.7  0.7  0.7  
Imports of goods from the EU 1.4  1.0  1.0  1.0  
Imports of services from the EU 2.5  1.8  1.7  1.7  
Imports from RUK 0.1  0.0  -0.0  -0.0  
CPI 1.0  0.7  0.7  0.7  
Employment 0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  
Real wage 0.7  0.6  0.5  0.5  
Consumption  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.5  
Government consumption 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 
Source: simulation results  
 
Following the increase in public expenditure there is an increase in prices. This initially reflects 
both capacity constraints and increased real wages as employment increases, reducing the 
unemployment rate. Negative competitiveness effects arising from the price increases, however, 
dampen the positive stimulus. By year 10, GDP and employment have increased by 0.2% and 0.3% 
                                                          
31 For simplicity we assume that the government expenditures only impact initially on demand. If the expenditure has beneficial 
supply-side effects (e.g. spending on training) then these results underestimate the beneficial impact of the fiscal savings. 
However, recall that government expenditure is falling in all the analyses of the trade shocks; if that expenditure has supply-side 
effects our analysis underestimates the scale of the likely contraction. See e.g. Lecca et al (2017). 
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respectively, and whilst public and household expenditure has increased, the positive demand 
effect is dampened by some crowding out of exports.  
How reasonable are the assumptions on which the results of Table 8 are based? Since the UK 
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝƐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐŐƌŽƐƐhĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞƐ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
greater share of agricultural subsidies would be maintained, at least initially, our assumption about 
the regional distribution of net fiscal savings seems a reasonable first approximation. However, 
the assumption that the whole of the current net fiscal transfer would be saved post Brexit is 
unrealistic except under the WTO scenario. However, as can be seen from the results in Table 8, 
the overall impacts of Brexit prove to be insensitive to any reasonable estimate of the scale of 
fiscal savings, given the extremely modest stimulus generated by what is the maximum possible 
fiscal saving. Accordingly, we do not pursue it further.32 
Note that these are the effects of the fiscal stimulus in isolation. This simulation does not take into 
account the trade impacts set out above. Whilst there is a modest boost to the economy, this is 
much smaller, even in the best case scenario in which the UK saves its entire current net fiscal 
contribution, than the negative effects from reduced EU trade identified in Table 7. 
Combined effect of the trade shocks and fiscal effects 
Adding the fiscal stimulus (Table 8) to the trade effects (Table 7) leads to a slight reduction in the 
overall negative effects, but fiscal savings do not come close to offsetting the adverse trade effects 
of Brexit. Scottish GDP now falls by 5.6% by period 10, rather than 5.8%.  
                                                          
32 ƌĞǀŝĞǁĞƌƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞh< ?ƐĨŝƐĐĂůĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶĂĨƚĞƌůĞĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞhĐŽƵůĚďĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĂƉŝƚĂ 
contributions in the Norway or Switzerland cases. This would have only a negligible impact, however, on our overall results. 
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Figure 2 provides a comparative analysis of various scenarios on GDP and Employment.  
Figure 2. Long-run effects on employment and GDP, % changes relative to baseline  
Source: simulation results 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we explore the possible consequences of leaving the EU for the Scottish economy. 
There have been a number of studies of the impact on the UK macro-economy and some have 
calculated the regional impacts in a pro rata manner. However, ours is the first attempt to provide 
a system-wide analysis of Brexit impacts simultaneously on both the Scottish and RUK economies, 
which necessitates an explicitly interregional approach. Our results support that approach: we find 
that spillover effects from the RUK to Scotland are substantial, accounting for nearly one fifth of 
the overall impact of Brexit on Scottish GDP.  
A number of general conclusions follow from our analysis of the likely impact of Brexit on the UK 
economy and its regions. First, withdrawal from the Single Market is, in the absence of significant 
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new bilateral trade deals, unambiguously bad news for the UK economy as a whole and for both 
the Scottish and RUK economies, although rather worse news for the latter given its greater 
integration with the EU. These differential impacts suggest that the effects of leaving the EU will 
vary spatially across the UK. Scotland is in a favoured position concerning regional data, modelling 
and policy expertise. It should be a priority of the UK government to strengthen these resources 
and capabilities in all regions of the UK. 
Second, the scale of the adverse impacts of Brexit on the Scottish and RUK economies depends on 
the precise trading arrangements that are negotiated. If no trade deal is secured and the WTO 
default position is adopted, the impact on trade flows alone could generate a loss of as much as 
nearly 6% of GDP after 10 years (if imports and exports are treated symmetrically). However, we 
find that a free trade agreement in these circumstances could limit the impact after 10 years to 
just over 4% of GDP. Brexit-related negotiations therefore really matter, in that they may 
significantly mitigate the adverse trade effects of leaving the Single Market. 
Third, the adverse impacts of Brexit can be mitigated to a degree using the reduction in the net 
fiscal contribution to the EU to stimulate public spending in both Scotland and RUK. However, even 
in the most optimistic case, where the UK makes no continuing contribution to the EU under WTO 
scenario, the net fiscal contribution does not come close to compensating for the adverse impact 
on trade.  
Fourth, UK policy may also matter in that it can directly influence elements of the trade barriers 
that affect imports. The populist view that it would be in our interest to raise tariff and non-tariff 
barriers on imports from the EU, especially when barriers are being imposed on our exports to the 
EU, is problematic. This would have a positive effect on the Scottish economy if imports were 
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primarily for consumption and workers were willing to accept a cut in their real wage. However, in 
practice, imports of intermediate goods are important, so barriers to EU imports constitute an 
adverse supply shock to the Scottish economy that is exacerbated if, as in normal times, workers 
bargain for real wages. Our results suggest that the imposition of barriers to imports from the EU 
by the UK would be self-defeating, and in fact would simply add  W possibly substantially  W to the 
scale of the Brexit-induced contraction. 
Fifth, our core ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚĂƐ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐĂ  “ǁŽƌƐƚĐĂƐĞƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ ? ? /Ĩ ?ĂƐ,D
Treasury and others believe, Brexit, through reducing the degree of openness of the UK economy, 
impacts adversely on productivity, further economic contraction would result. Similarly, given that 
Brexit makes both Scotland and RUK less attractive locations to live and work, since real wages and 
consumption per head will be lower and unemployment rates higher as a consequence, there will 
be an incentive for out-migration, which would further depress economic activity. However, we 
should sound a note of caution here in that these conclusions are predicated upon a ceteris paribus 
assumption, which implies that we do not consider, for example, possible new third country trade 
deals, or any other possible policy responses. 
Future research should consider alternative scenarios as appropriate, perhaps extended, subject 
to data limitations, to the other regions of the UK, although retention of the interregional approach 
would be essential (and would include competing regions closest to Scotland). As negotiations 
proceed it may be possible to narrow the range of projected outcomes, once greater clarity is 
forthcoming about possible future trade relations, including the potential for trade deals with third 
countries. Clearly, however, successful trade negotiations, and indeed economic growth in the EU 
and the rest of the world, could mitigate, some of the impacts identified here.  
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Appendix. Complete model listing. Prices 
 
ܲܯܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܲܯܧܷതതതതതതതതത௥ǡ௜ (A.1) 
ܲܯ ௥ܹǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܲܯܹതതതതതതത௥ǡ௜ (A.2) 
ܲܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧  ? ෍ܸ ܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧௝ ൌ ܲܯܹതതതതതതത௥ǡ௜  ? ෍ ܸܯ ௥ܹǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧௝ ൅ ܲܯܧܷതതതതതതതതത௥ǡ௜  ? ෍ ܸܯܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧௝  (A.3) 
ܲܧ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܲܧതതതത௥ǡ௜ (A.4) 
ܲܧܷ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܲܧܷതതതതതത௥ǡ௜ (A.5) 
ܲܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܲܳ௥ᇱǡ௜ǡ௧ (A.6) 
ܲܳ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܴܲ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧  ? ௥ܴǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܲܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧  ? ܯܸܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܲܯ௜ǡ௧  ? ܯ௜ǡ௧ܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܯܸܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧൅ܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧  (A.7) 
ܲܫܴ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ  ? ܸܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧௜  ?ܲ ܴ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൅  ? ܸܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧௜  ?ܲ ܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ? ܸܫܴ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧௜  (A.8) 
ܲ ௥ܻǡ௝ǡ௧  ? ௥ܽǡ௝௒ ൌ ൭ܴܲ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧  ? ൫ ? െ ܾݐܽݔ௥ǡ௝ െ ݏݑܾ௥ǡ௝ െ ݀݁݌௥ǡ௝൯ െ ෍ ܽ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௏ ܲܳ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧௜ ൱ (A.9) ܷܥܭ௥ǡ௧ ൌ ܲ݇௥ǡ௧  ?ሺݎ௥ ൅ ߜ௥ሻ (A.10) 
ܲܿ௥ǡ௧ଵିఙ೎ ൌ ෍ ߜ௥ǡ௝௙௝  ?ܲ ܳ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧ଵିఙ೎ (A.11) ܲ݃௥ǡ௧ଵିఙ೒ ൌ ෍ ߜ௥ǡ௝௚௝  ?ܲ ܳ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧ଵିఙ೒  (A.12) ܲݒ௥ǡ௧ଵିఘ ൌ ෍ ෍ ܽ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௏௝  ?ܲ ܳ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ଵିఘ௜  (A.13) 
ݓ௥ǡ௧௕ ൌ ݓ௥ǡ௧൫ ? ൅ ௥߬ǡ௧൯ (A.14) 
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݈݊ ቆ ݓ௥ǡ௧௕ܿ݌݅௥ǡ௧ቇ ൌ ܾ௥ െ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?݈݊ ൫ݑ௥ǡ௧൯ (A.15) 
ݎ݇௥ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ܲ ௥ܻǡ௝ǡ௧  ? ߜ௥ǡ௝௞  ? ܣ௥௒దೕ  ? ቆܻ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧ܭ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧ቇଵିదೕ (A.16)  
ܲ݇௥ǡ௧ ൌ  ? ܲܳ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧  ? ? ܭܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௜௝  ?  ? ܭܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௝௜  (A.17)  
Production technology  
ܺ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܣ௥௑  ? ൤ߜ௥ǡ௜௒  ? ௥ܻǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔೉ ൅ ߜ௥ǡ௜௏  ? ܮ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔೉ ൨ ଵఘ೔೉  (A.18)  
௥ܻǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ቆܣ௑௥ఘೕ೉  ? ߜ௥ǡ௝௒  ?ܲ ܳ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧ܲ ௥ܻǡ௝ǡ௧ ቇ ଵଵିఘೕ೉  ? ௥ܺǡ௝ǡ௧ (A.19)  
௥ܸǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ቆܣ௑௥ఘೕ೉  ? ߜ௥ǡ௝௏  ?ܲ ܳ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧ܲݒ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧ ቇ ଵଵିఘೕ೉  ? ௥ܺǡ௝ǡ௧ (A.20)  
ܸ ௥ܸǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ܽ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௏  ? ௥ܸǡ௜ǡ௧ (A.21)  
௥ܻǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܣ௒௥  ? ൤ߜ௥ǡ௜௞  ? ܭ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ೊ ൅ ߜ௥ǡ௜௟  ? ܮ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ೊ ൨ ଵఘ೔ೊ (A.22)  
ܮ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ቆܣ௒௥ఘೕೊ  ? ߜ௥ǡ௝௟  ?ܲ ௥ܻǡ௝ǡ௧ݓ௥ǡ௧ ቇ ଵଵିఘೕೊ  ? ௥ܻǡ௝ǡ௧ (A.23)  
Trade  
ܸ ௥ܸǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௩  ? ൤ߜ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௠ ܸܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൅ ߜ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௜௥ ܸܫܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൨ ଵఘ೔ಲ  (A.24)  
ܸܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ܸܫܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ቈቆߜ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௠ߜ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௜௥ ቇ  ? ቆܲܫܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ܲܯ௥ǡ௜ ቇ቉ ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ  (A.25)  
ܸܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௠  ? ൤ߜ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௠௘௨ܸܯܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൅ ߜ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௠௪ܸܯ ௥ܹǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൨ ଵఘ೔ಲ (A.26)  
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ܸܯܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ܸܯ ௥ܹǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ቈቆߜ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௠௘௨ߜ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௠௪ ቇ  ? ቆܲܯ ௥ܹǡ௜ǡ௧ܲܯܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ቇ቉ ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ (A.27)  
ܸܫܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௜௥  ? ൤ߜ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௜ ܸܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൅ ߜ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௥ ܸܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൨ ଵఘ೔ಲ (A.28)  
ܸܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ܸܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ቈቆߜ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௥ߜ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௩௜ ቇ  ? ቆܲ ܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ܴܲ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ቇ቉ ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ (A.29)  
ܧ ?ܴ ܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܧ ?ܴ ܧܷതതതതതതതതത௜  ? ቆܲܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ܴܲ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ቇఙ೔ೣ  (A.30)  
ܧ ?ܴܰܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܧ ?ܴܰܧܷതതതതതതതതതതത௜  ? ቆܲ ܧ௥ǡ௜ܴܲ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ቇఙ೔ೣ  (A.31)  
ܧ ?ܫܰܶܧ ௥ܴǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܯܸܫ௥ᇲǡ௜ǡ௧ (A.32)  
ܧ ?ܫܰܶܧ ௥ܴǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܧ ?ܴ ܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܧ ?ܴܰܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܧ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧  (A.33)  
Regional Demand 
ܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ෍ ܸܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൅ ܳܪܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܸܴܳ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܳܩܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧௝  (A.34)  
Total Production 
ܺ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ෍ ܸ ௥ܸǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൅ ܳܪ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܳ ௥ܸǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܳܩ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܧ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧௝  (A.35)  
 
Households and other Domestic Institutions 
 
ܻܪ௥ǡ௧ ൌ ൫ ? െ ௥߬ǡ௧൯ܮ௥ǡ௧ௌ ൫ ? െ ݑ௥ǡ௧൯ݓ௥ǡ௧ ൅ ܴܶܨ௥ǡ௧ ൅ ȫ௥ǡ௧ (A.36)  
ܶݎ ௥݂ǡ௧ ൌ ܲܥ௥ǡ௧  ? ܶݎ݂തതതതത (A.37)  
ȫ௥ǡ௧ ൌ ݀௥௛  ? ෍ݎ݇௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ܭ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧௜  (A.38)  
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ܵ௥ǡ௧ ൌ ݉݌ݏ௥  ?ܻ ܪ௥ǡ௧ (A.39)  
ܥ௥ǡ௧ ൌ ܻܪ௥ǡ௧ െ ܵ௥ǡ௧ (A.40)  
ܳܪ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߜ௥ǡ௜௙ ఘ೔೎  ? ቆܲ ܿ௥ǡ௧ܲܳ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ቇఘ೔೎  ? ܥ௥ǡ௧ (A.41)  
ܳܪ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ௥ǡ௜௙  ? ൤ߜ௥ǡ௜௛௜௥  ? ܳܪܫ ௥ܴǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൅ ߜ௥ǡ௜௛௠  ? ܳܪܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൨ ଵఘ೔ಲ  (A.42)  
ܳܪܫܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ܳܪܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ቈቆߜ௥ǡ௜௛௜௥ߜ௥ǡ௜௛௠ቇ  ? ቆܲܯ௜ܲܫܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ቇ቉ ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ  (A.43)  
ܳܪܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ௥ǡ௜௙  ? ൤ߜ௥ǡ௜௛௠௘௨  ? ܳܪܯܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൅ ߜ௥ǡ௜௛௠௪  ? ܳܪܯ ௥ܹǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൨ ଵఘ೔ಲ (A.44)  
ܳܪܯܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ǡ௧ܳܪܯ ௥ܹǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ቈቆߜ௥ǡ௜௛௠௘௨ߜ௥ǡ௜௛௠௪ ቇ  ? ቆ ܲܯ ௜ܹܲܯܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ǡ௧ቇ቉ ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ (A.45)  
ܳܪܫܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ௥ǡ௜௙௜௥  ? ൤ߜ௥ǡ௜௛௥  ? ܳܪ ௥ܴǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൅ ߜ௥ǡ௜௛௜  ? ܳܪܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൨ ଵఘ೔ಲ  (A.46)  
ܳܪܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ܳܪܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ቈቆߜ௥ǡ௜௛௥ߜ௥ǡ௜௛௜ ቇ  ? ቆܲ ܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ܴܲ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ቇ቉ ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ  (A.47)  
Government  
ܨܦ௥ǡ௧ ൌ ܩ௥ǡ௧ܲ݃௥ǡ௧ ൅ ෍ ܴܶܩௗ௡௚௜௡௦ǡ௥ǡ௧  ?ௗ௡௚௜௡௦ ܲܿ௥ǡ௧
െ ቌ݀௥௚  ? ෍ݎ݇௥ǡ௜ǡ௧  ? ܭ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧௜ ൅ ෍ ܫܤ ௥ܶǡ௜ǡ௧௜ ൅ ߬௥ǡ௧  ? ෍ ܮ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧௝  ? ݓ௥ǡ௧ ൅ ܨܧ௥തതതതത  ? ߝ௥ǡ௧ቍ (A.48)  
ܳܩ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߜ௥ǡ௜௚  ? ܩ௥ǡ௧ (A.49)  
ܳܩܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܳܩ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧;  ܳܩܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ  ? (A.50)  
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Investment Demand  
ܳ ௥ܸǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ෍ ܭܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝௝  ? ܬ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧ (A.51)  
ܳ ௥ܸǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ௥ǡ௜௩  ? ൤ߜ௥ǡ௜௤௩௠  ? ܸܳܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൅ ߜ௥ǡ௜௤௩௜௥  ? ܸܳܫ ௥ܴǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൨ ଵఘ೔ಲ  (A.52)  
ܸܳܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ܸܳܫܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ൥൭ߜ௥ǡ௜௤௩௠ߜ௥ǡ௜௤௩௜௥൱  ? ቆܲܫܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ܲܯ௥ǡ௜ ቇ൩
ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ
 (A.53)  
ܸܳܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ௥ǡ௜௩  ? ൤ߜ௥ǡ௜௤௩௠௘௨  ? ܸܳܯܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൅ ߜ௥ǡ௜௤௩௠௪  ? ܸܳܯ ௥ܹǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൨ ଵఘ೔ಲ  (A.54)  
ܸܳܯܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ǡ௧ܸܳܯ ௥ܹǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ቈቆߜ௥ǡ௜௤௩௠௘௨ߜ௥ǡ௜௤௩௠௪ ቇ  ? ቆܲܯ ௥ܹǡ௜ǡ௧ܲܯܧ ௥ܷǡ௜ቇ቉ ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ (A.55)  
ܸܳܫܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ௥ǡ௜௩௜௥  ? ൤ߜ௥ǡ௜௤௩௜  ? ܸܳܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൅ ߜ௥ǡ௜௤௩௥  ? ܸܳ ௥ܴǡ௜ǡ௧ఘ೔ಲ ൨ ଵఘ೔ಲ (A.56)  
ܸܴܳ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ܸܳܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ൥൭ߜ௥ǡ௜௤௩௥ߜ௥ǡ௜௤௩௜ ൱  ? ቆܲ ܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ܴܲ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ቇ൩
ଵଵିఘ೔ಲ
 (A.57)  
Time path of investment  
ܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ݒ  ? ൫ܭܵ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧כ െ ܭܵ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧൯  ? ߜܭܵ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ (A.58) 
ܭܵ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧כ ൌ ቆܣ௒௥ఘೕೊ  ? ߜ௥ǡ௝௞  ?ܲ ௥ܻǡ௝ǡ௧ݎ݇௥ǡ௝ǡ௧ቇ ଵଵିఘೕೊ  ? ௥ܻǡ௝ǡ௧ (A.59) 
Factors accumulation  
ܭܵ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ ? െ ߜ௥ሻ  ?ܭܵ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ (A.60) 
ܮܵ௥ǡ௧ ൌ ܮܵതതത௥  (A.61) 
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ܭ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܭܵ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ (A.62) 
ܮܵ௥ǡ௧  ? ൫ ? െ ݑ௥ǡ௧൯ ൌ ෍ ܮ௥ǡ௝ǡ௧௝  (A.63) 
Indirect taxes and subsidies  
ܫܤ ௜ܶ ǡ௧ ൌ ܾݐܽݔ௜  ? ௜ܺǡ௧  ?ܲ ௜ܳ ǡ௧ (A.64) 
Total demand for import and current account  
ܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ෍ ܸܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൅௝ ෍ ܸܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൅௝ ܳܪܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܳܩܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܸܳܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܸܳܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ (A.65) 
ܶܤ௥ǡ௧ ൌ ෍ ܯ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧௜  ?ܲ ܯ௥ǡ௜ െ ෍ ܧ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧  ?ܲ ܧ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧௜ ൅ ߝ  ?ሺܴܧܯ௥ ൅ ܨܧ௥ሻ (A.66) 
Assets  
ܸܨ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߣ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧  ? ܭ௥ǡ௜ǡ௧ (A.67) 
ܦ௥ǡ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ ? ൅ ݎ௥ሻ  ? ܦ௥ǡ௧ ൅ ܶܤ௥ǡ௧ (A.68) 
ܲ݃௥ǡ௧ାଵ  ?ܩܦ௥ǡ௧ାଵ ൌ ቈ ? ൅ ݎ௥ ൅ ቆܲܿ௥ǡ௧ାଵܲܿ௥ǡ௧ െ  ?ቇ቉  ?ܩܦ௥ǡ௧  ?ܲ ݃௥ǡ௧ ൅ ܨܦ௥ǡ௧ (A.69) 
Steady State conditions  
ߜ௥  ?ܭܵ௥ǡ௜ǡ் ൌ ܫ௥ǡ௜ǡ் (A.70) 
ܴ௥ǡ௜ǡ்௞ ൌ ߣ௥ǡ௜ǡ்ሺݎ௥ ൅ ߜ௥ሻ (A.71) 
ܨܦ௥ǡ் ൌ െ ቈݎ௥ ൅ ቆܲܿ௥ǡ௧ାଵܲܿ௥ǡ௧ െ  ?ቇ቉  ?ܲ݃௥ǡ்  ?ܩܦ௥ǡ் (A.72) 
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ܶܤ௥ǡ் ൌ െݎ  ? ܦ௥ǡ்  (A.73) 
ܰܨ ௧ܹݎ ൌ ሺ ? െ ௧߬ሻܮ௧௦ ሺ ? െ ݑ௧ሻݓ௧ ൅ ܶݎ ௧݂ (A.74) 
ܨ ௥ܹǡ௧  ? ݎ௥ǡ் ൌ ȫ௥ǡ௧ െ ܵ௥ǡ௧ (A.75) 
Glossary 
i,j   (i=j)                   the set of goods or industries 
r,r'   (r=r')                   the set of regions 
 
Prices  ܻܲݎǡ݅ǡݐ value added price ܴܲݎǡ݅ǡݐ regional price ܲܳݎǡ݅ǡݐ output price ܲܫܴݎǡ݅ǡݐ national commodity price (regional + RUK) ܲܫݎǡ݅ǡݐ price of RUK commodities  ܲܯݎǡ݅ǡݐ price of ROW commodities ܲܯܧܷݎǡ݅ǡݐ price of REU commodities ܲܯܹݎǡ݅ǡݐ price of non-EU commodities ܲܧݎǡ݅ǡݐ price of non-EU exports  ܲܧܷݎǡ݅ǡݐ price of REU exports  ݎ݇ݎǡ݅ǡݐ rate of return to capital ݓݎǡݐ unified nominal wage ݓݎǡݐܾ  after tax wage ܲ݇ݎǡݐ capital good price ܷܥܭݎǡݐ user cost of capital 
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ߣݎǡ݅ǡݐ shadow price of capital ܲܿݎǡݐ aggregate consumption price ܲ݃ݎǡݐ aggregate price of Government consumption goods ߝ exchange rate [fixed] 
  
Endogenous variables  ܺݎǡ݅ǡݐ total output ܴݎǡ݅ǡݐ regional supply ܯݎǡ݅ǡݐ total import ܧݎǡ݅ǡݐ total export (interregional + international) ܧ ?ܴ ܧܷݎǡ݅ǡݐ export to REU ܧ ?ܴܰܧ ܷݎǡ݅ǡݐ export to non-EU ܻݎǡ݅ǡݐ value added ܮݎǡ݅ǡݐ labour demand ܭݎǡ݅ǡݐ physical capital demand ܭܵݎǡ݅ǡݐ capital stock ܮܵݎǡ݅ǡݐ labour supply ܸܸݎǡ݅ǡ݆ǡݐ total intermediate inputs in i and j ܸݎǡ݅ǡݐ Total intermediate inputs in i  ܸܴݎǡ݅ǡ݆ǡݐ regional intermediate inputs ܸܯݎǡ݅ǡ݆ǡݐ ROW intermediate inputs ܸܯܧܷݎǡ݅ǡ݆ǡݐ REU intermediate inputs ܸܯܹݎǡ݅ǡ݆ǡݐ Non-EU intermediate inputs ܸܫܴݎǡ݅ǡ݆ǡݐ national intermediate inputs (ROW + RUK) ܸܫݎǡ݅ǡ݆ǡݐ RUK intermediate inputs 
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ܩݎǡ݅ǡݐ aggregate government expenditure  ܳܩݎǡ݅ǡݐ total government expenditure by sector i ܳܩܴݎǡ݅ǡݐ regional government expenditure ܳܩܯݎǡ݅ǡݐ government expenditure( RUK + ROW) ܥݎǡݐ aggregated household consumption ܳܪݎǡ݅ǡݐ total households consumption in sector i   ܳܪܴݎǡ݅ǡݐ regional consumption in sector i  ܳܪܫܴݎǡ݅ǡݐ regional + RUK consumption in sector i  ܳܪܯݎǡ݅ǡݐ ROW import consumption in sector i  ܳܪܯܧܷݎǡ݅ǡݐ REU import consumption in sector i  ܳܪܯܹݎǡ݅ǡݐ Non-EU import consumption in sector i  ܸܳݎǡ݅ǡݐ total investment by sector of origin i ܸܴܳݎǡ݅ǡݐ regional investment by sector of origin i ܸܳܯݎǡ݅ǡݐ ROW investment demand ܸܳܯܧܷݎǡ݅ǡݐ REU investment demand ܸܳܯܹݎǡ݅ǡݐ Non-EU investment demand ܸܳܫܴݎǡ݅ǡݐ national investment (regional + RUK) ܸܳܫݎǡ݅ǡݐ RUK investment demand ܫݎǡ݆ǡݐ investment by sector of destination j ܬݎǡ݆ǡݐ investment by destination j with adjustment cost ݑݎǡݐ regional unemployment rate ܴݎǡ݅ǡݐ݇  marginal net revenue of capital ܵݎǡݐ domestic non-government saving ܶݎ݂ݎǡݐ households net transfer 
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YHr,t Household income  ܶܤݎǡݐ current account balance 
  
Exogenous variables  ܴܧܯതതതതതതݎǡݐ remittances for Household ܨܧതതതതݎǡݐ remittances for the Government ܩܵܣܸݎǡݐ government saving ݎݎ interest rate 
  
Elasticities  ߪ constant elasticity of marginal utility  ߩ݅ܺ  elasticity between intermediate inputs and value added ߩܻ݅  elasticity between capital and labour ߩ݅ܣ elasticity in Armington function ߪ݅ݔ elasticity of export with respect to terms of trade 
  
Parameters  ܽݎǡ݅ǡ݆ܸ  Input-output coefficients for i used in j ܽݎǡ݆ܻ  share of value added on production ߜݎǡ݆ܻǡܸ shares in CES output function in sector j ߜݎǡ݆݇ǡ݈ shares in value added function in sector j ߜݎǡ݅ǡ݆ݒ݅ݎǡݒ݉ǡݒݎǡݒ݅ shares parameters in CES function for intermediate goods ߜݎǡ݅ǡ݆ݍݒ݅ݎǡݍݒ݉ǡݍݒݎǡݍݒ݅ shares parameters in CES function for investment goods ߜݎǡ݅ǡ݄݄ݎǡ݄݉ shares parameters in CES function for households consumption  ߜݎǡ݅݃ݎǡ݃݉ shares parameters in CES function for government consumption  
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ߛݎǡ݅ǡ݆ݒݒǡݒ݅ݎ shift parameter in CES functions for intermediate goods ߛݎǡ݂݅  shift parameter in CES function for households consumption goods ߛݎǡ݅݃  shift parameter in CES function for government consumption  ܾݐܽݔݎǡ݅ rate of business tax ܭܯݎǡ݅ǡ݆ physical capital matrix ݉݌ݏݎ rate of saving  ߬ݎ rate of income tax ߩ pure rate of consumer time preference ܾܾݎ rate of distortion or incentive to investment ߜݎ rate of depreciation 
 
 
